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Abstract
Humans have a demonstrated tendency to copy or imitate the behavior and attitude of oth-
ers and actively influence each other’s opinions. In plenty of empirical contexts, publicly
revealed opinions are not necessarily in line with internal opinions, causing complex social
influence dynamics. We study to what extent hypocrisy is sustained during opinion formation
and how hidden opinions change the convergence to consensus in a group. We build and
analyze a modified version of the voter model with hypocrisy in a complete graph with a neu-
tral competition between two alternatives. We compare the process from various initial con-
ditions, varying the proportions between the two opinions in the external (revealed) and
internal (hidden) layer. According to our results, hypocrisy always prolongs the time needed
for reaching a consensus. In a complete graph, this time span increases linearly with group
size. We find that the group-level opinion emerges in two steps: (1) a fast and directional
process, during which the number of the two kinds of hypocrites equalizes; and (2) a slower,
random drift of opinions. During stage (2), the ratio of opinions in the external layer is
approximately equal to the ratio in the internal layer; that is, the hidden opinions do not differ
significantly from the revealed ones at the group level. We furthermore find that the initial
abundances of opinions, but not the initial prevalence of hypocrisy, predicts the mean con-
sensus time and determines the opinions’ probabilities of winning. These insights highlight
the unimportance of hypocrisy in consensus formation under neutral conditions. Our results
have important societal implications in relation to hidden voter preferences in polls and
improve our understanding of opinion formation in a more realistic setting than that of con-
ventional voter models.
1 Introduction
Public opinion is formed as a result of interrelated changes in individual opinions. Through a
large number of social interactions, humans are greatly influenced by the opinions, attitudes,
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and behavior of others. The dynamics resulting from these interactions have been studied in
various models [1–9]. One of the most appealing and widely studied representations is the
voter model due to its simplicity [10–14]. The paradigmatic voter model (which we will call
the Basic Voter Model, BVM) represents the opinions of individuals as a binary variable in a
single opinion dimension. At each update, an individual adopts the opinion of one of his
acquaintances. In the BVM, every individual is assumed to express his inner conviction.
In practice, however, there might be a difference between an individual’s publicly revealed
and internal opinion. In the present paper, we focus on hypocrisy (i.e., individuals exhibit “self-
censored” opinions in public [15]) and the abundance of hypocrites (i.e., individuals whose
external and internal opinions differ). We study their frequency in the group and their role in
the consensus-finding process.
Hypocrisy is abundant in all aspects of human social life. Voters withhold their true opin-
ions in opinion polls, causing difficulties for the prediction of true outcomes [16–19]. Humans
adjust their views and opinions to the circle in which they are present [20]. Social desirability
is a general driver of expressing an opinion [21–23]. Even in the absence of direct influence or
persuasion, individuals adjust their revealed opinion if they are exposed to the attitudes of oth-
ers [24]. Actual behavior can fall very far from self-reports that are subject to social desirability
bias, for instance in dietary intake [25], household labor [26,27], or physical activity [28].
Asch’s classic experiments [29], in which he studied the influence of group pressure on indi-
vidual opinions, show significant levels of conformity: participants of the experiments adopted
the group’s false opinion in a third of the trials, and more than half of the participants adopted
a false group consensus at least once. Haun and Tomasello [30] demonstrated that, already at a
young age, children try to say what they are expected to say without changing their own “real”
judgment of the situation.
Many people attend church services without true faith, express popular opinions in discus-
sions and meetings, follow a fashion trend they do not fancy, or adhere to regulations they dis-
agree with. They show off with conspicuous consumption or by mowing their lawn while they
have better things to do. People support morals they are not engaged with privately, have flexi-
ble virtues, and, following others, easily absolve themselves of moral responsibility [31–33].
Individuals might even openly support norms or legitimize a political system they privately
do not sympathize with [34,35]. For example, Jiang and Yang [36] report quantitative evidence
for “preference falsification” after a political purge in Shanghai in 2006. Laboratory experi-
ments and computational models show that humans might punish norm violators in order to
conform to group pressure against their own inner conviction [37,38]. The willingness to con-
form to social expectations might even lead to self-destructive behaviors such as binge drink-
ing, shoplifting, and smoking among adolescents [39]. In extreme cases, this kind of hypocrisy
can support a witch hunt, ostracism, or the public condemnation of scapegoats.
Hypocrisy is also a general feature of organizational behavior where reputation and promo-
tions are at stake [40–42]. Within organizations, language use is often adjusted to the audience.
For instance, the tone of political correctness depends on the expectations of receivers [43].
According to Noelle-Neumann [44], a significant proportion of people try to avoid isolation in
the case of public questions. She posits that social relations and acceptance in their own envi-
ronment are more important to people than revealing their own views in public.
All instances of hypocrisy create cognitive dissonance [45], which can be reduced mainly in
two ways: internalization or externalization. In the case of internalization, the individual
accepts the belief or opinion that he has expressed publicly [46]. Adjusting the internal opinion
is an important last step in the process of socialization that is well described in the classic socio-
logical and social psychological literature [47,48]. Opinions and individual attitudes are the
products of contact with other members of the group that creates an internal and external
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conflict “with its resolution based on the internalization of external norms” [49]. Internaliza-
tion is distinct from compliance as it covers the private acceptance of the norm or attitude
[46]. As a result, the individual can be said to be depersonalized and fully assimilated to the
group [50,51].
In the case of externalization, the previously concealed opinion becomes publicly expressed.
In practice, this requires courage or expressiveness. The “coming out” necessarily results in
public discomfort, but often produces relief, a positive cognitive and emotional state. Acting
and producing a poker face for the inhibition of inner opinions is certainly costly [52], and the
individual is liberated from these costs by expressing his internal belief. It depends on the
empirical context to which extent it is feasible to reduce cognitive dissonance by internaliza-
tion or externalization. For instance, externalization is particularly problematic for political
opinions in oppressive regimes, but strongly encouraged when diverse standpoints need to be
revealed such as in critical academic debates.
The objective of this article is to analyze the role that hypocrisy, internalization and exter-
nalization play in opinion formation. As a more realistic alternative to the Basic Voter Model
(BVM), we study the Concealed Voter Model (CVM), in which the publicly expressed (exter-
nal) opinion can differ from the internal one [53]. Before we give a detailed definition of both
models in Section 2, let us first state and motivate their underlying assumptions. The BVM
and CVM share the following simplifications:
A. There are only two kinds of potential opinions (which we call “red” and “blue”) on a partic-
ular issue, and these are mutually exclusive.
B. In the external layer, individuals interact in pairs.
C. The group is homogeneous in the sense that each rate is the same for all individuals and at
all times.
D. Red and blue opinions have the same transition rates. That is, their competition is neutral.
Most versions of the voter model in the literature apply these simplifying assumptions (for
reviews, see [12,14]). Extensions have relaxed some of the assumptions. For example, (A) was
relaxed in the model by Vazquez and Redner [54], and (B) by Lambiotte and Redner [55].
Assumption (C) was relaxed by introducing zealots who never change their opinion [56,57]
and (D) was relaxed in the biased voter model [58]. The CVM keeps (A)-(D) and adds an
internal layer [53] (Fig 1). Some previous versions of the voter model have also considered a
duality of opinions similar to our juxtaposition of external versus internal layer (e.g., [59,60]),
but the internal opinions were static. A model that distinguishes between private and
expressed opinions, but assumes continuous instead of binary opinions, was introduced by Ye
et al. [61] and by Huang and Wen [62]. The CVM is the first discrete-state voter model in
which the opinions in the internal layer can vary in response to the external layer within the
individual, but not as a result of links to other internal opinions. In other multilayer voter
models, nodes are connected in a multiplex network whose layers contain the same set of
nodes with partially overlapping edges [63–67]. However, each layer in these multiplex models
contains intra-layer edges so that none of the layers plays the role that the internal layer plays
in the CVM: it contains private, hidden opinions that are unknown to other individuals.
Real-life examples for assumption (A) include those issues that are at stake in a social group
and whose answer must be one of exactly two possibilities (e.g., yes/no or false/true). Many US
elections, for instance, come down to a choice between only the Democrats or the Republicans.
A recent example with exactly two alternatives on the ballot was the 2016 Brexit referendum,
where voters could only choose between “remain” or “leave”.
The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation
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Assumption (B) implies that external opinions can spread only from person to person so
that the role of mass media is negligible. Mass media tend to portray the majority opinion as
socially desirable and, hence, may increase the number of hypocrites in the population. Issues
that are less influenced by mass media comply more with (B), for example newly trending
issues (such as new slang expressions or underground music), shameful issues (e.g., norms of
toilet use), or topics that are only of local or personal importance and interest (e.g., issues of
taste, norms or habits in a small group or community).
Assumption (C) ensures an equal opportunity structure for the individuals in our model. It
excludes the possibility that some of them can react to social influence, externalize, or internal-
ize at a different rate from others. Assumption (D) guarantees that the dynamics does not give
an intrinsic bias to one of the opinions. A typical asymmetry in real opinion formation may
arise, for example, when one of the opinions provides more benefits in economic or social
terms for the individuals than the other. We wish to exclude this kind of bias in order to study
the process of spreading in a pure form. Thus, the BVM and the CVM can be used as neutral
references to which more complex models or real-life systems can be compared.
Our previous results in the CVM have shown that, on average, the processes of internaliza-
tion and externalization delay the consensus [53] because a minority opinion may still linger
in the internal layer even when it has temporarily disappeared in public. In this paper, pursu-
ing this path further, we ask fundamental questions about the role of hidden opinions and
hypocrisy in the consensus formation process. We examine the proportion of hypocrites in the
group over time and their effect on the dynamics of consensus formation. Our goal is to reveal
Fig 1. The Basic Voter Model (BVM) versus the Concealed Voter Model (CVM). (A) In the BVM, every individual is represented by a node in a single layer, which is
“external” in the sense that all of its neighbors can see and copy his opinion. The tension that is caused by the disagreement between neighbors (for example between the
blue individual 1 and the red individual 2) can be released by adopting the neighbor’s opinion. Such copies happen with a rate c. (B) In the CVM, every individual is
represented by two nodes: one in the external and another in the internal layer. For example, let us consider individual 1, outlined by the green rectangle. His external/
internal opinion is marked by a blue/red circle. Because these opinions differ, we call individual 1 a “hypocrite”. The tension between the external versus internal
opinion can be released either by externalization or internalization (with the corresponding rates e and i). None of the individuals knows the internal opinion of any
other individual. Hence, there are no edges within the internal layer.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.g001
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how hidden opinions influence the diversity of public opinions over time and how they shape
the dynamics leading to eventual unanimity.
2 Methods
In the Basic Voter Model (BVM), the opinion of each individual is one node in a single, exter-
nal network layer (Fig 1A). By contrast, the Concealed Voter Model (CVM) represents each
individual by two nodes: one opinion in the external and another in the internal layer, which
do not need to be identical (i.e., hypocrisy is possible). In the BVM and CVM, we model the
external layer as a complete graph. We include a link from each node to itself. The models
with and without the self-link are in fact merely reparameterized versions of each other (see S1
Appendix). We include the self-link because it simplifies the notation of the equation-based
analysis in the S1 Appendix. While the external nodes are thus maximally connected with each
other, every node in the internal layer is linked only to the external node representing the
same individual (Fig 1B).
We call the alternative opinions “red” or “blue” and denote the opinions in the external ver-
sus internal layer by capital versus lower case letters (R: external red, r: internal red, B: external
blue, b: internal blue). In the BVM, one letter is sufficient to characterize the state of every indi-
vidual: R or B. We denote the fraction of agents in these states as ρR and ρB = 1−ρR. The group
has reached a consensus when ρR = 1 or ρB = 1. In the CVM, we need two letters to describe
the state: Rb (externally red hypocrite), Br (externally blue hypocrite), Rr (red frank) or Bb
(blue frank). We denote the fraction of individuals in these states by ρRb, ρBr, ρRr, and ρBb
respectively. The state of the whole group can be described by the combination (ρRb, ρBr, ρRr).
We do not need to explicitly include ρBb because it is uniquely determined by ρBb = 1
−ρRb−ρBr−ρRr. The abundances of internal and external opinions can be represented by the
2×2 matrix shown in Table 1. The proportion of hypocrites is ρRb+ρBr. The group is in a con-
sensus when ρRr = 1 or ρBb = 1. That is, we define a consensus as a state in which only one of
the opinions exists; the alternative opinion has completely disappeared even from the internal
layer.
For both models, the consensus time Tcons is defined as the duration between the initial
state and the consensus. (Its synonyms are exit time, hitting time, or first-passage time; cf.
[58,68]).
An agent-based Monte Carlo simulation of the BVM with N individuals proceeds according
to the following algorithm.
1. Initialization: We initialize the opinions such that a given fraction ρR of the nodes are red.
All other nodes are blue. We initialize time: t 0.
2. Iteration:
i. We choose a “focal” individual f uniformly at random from all of the N individuals.
Table 1. Contingency table showing the fraction of individuals with different combinations of external and internal
opinions.
External opinion
R B sum
Internal opinion r ρRr ρBr ρr
b ρRb ρBb ρb
sum ρR ρB 1
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.t001
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ii. We pick a neighbor n of the focal individual uniformly at random from all of its neigh-
bors. (On a complete graph with self-links, all individuals are neighbors of each other so
that n can be any individual in the group.)
iii. f adopts n’s opinion. That is, if f and n have different opinions, we change f’s opinion to
that of n. Otherwise the system remains unchanged.
iv. We increment the time by a random number Δt drawn from an exponential distribu-
tion with mean 1cN, where c is a positive number: t t+Δt. We can interpret c as the rate
with which individuals copy opinions of any of their neighbors.
v. If all nodes have the same color (i.e., the individuals have reached a consensus), we set
TðBVMÞcons  t and terminate. Otherwise we go back to step (i).
Compared to the BVM, the CVM adds two options to step (ii): besides copying a neighbor’s
external opinion, individuals may also externalize or internalize (Fig 1B) to reduce cognitive
dissonance as described in Section 1. We model copying, externalization and internalization
as independent Poisson processes with rates c, e and i, respectively, according to the following
agent-based algorithm.
1. Initialization: We initialize the opinions so that
• a given fraction ρRb of the individuals is externally red and internally blue,
• a given fraction ρBr is externally blue and internally red,
• a given fraction ρRr is red in both layers,
• the rest is blue in both layers.
We also initialize time: t 0.
2. Iteration:
i. We choose a “focal” individual f uniformly at random from all of the N individuals.
ii. We generate a random number u that is uniformly distributed between 0 and c+e+i. We
now distinguish between three cases.
Case (A): Copying. If u<c, then f adopts the opinion of a random neighbor and we imme-
diately go to step (iii).
Case (B): Externalization. Otherwise, if c�u<c+e, then f externalizes. That is, if the cur-
rent state of f is Rb, we change its state to Bb. If the current state is Br, we change f’s state
to Rr. For all other current states, the system does not change. We subsequently go
immediately to step (iii).
Case (C): Internalization. Otherwise f internalizes. That is, if the current state of f is Rb,
we change its state to Rr. If the current state is Br, we change f’s state to Bb. In all other
cases, the system does not change.
iii. We increment the time (i.e., t t+Δt) by a random number Δt drawn from an exponen-
tial distribution with mean 1
ðcþeþiÞN. We can interpret c+e+i as the rate with which indi-
viduals are active because they copy, externalize, or internalize.
iv. If all nodes have the same color (i.e., all internal and external opinions are identical),
we set TðCVMÞcons  t and terminate. Otherwise we go back to step (i).
We show snapshots of two illustrative sample runs of the CVM algorithm in Fig 2.
The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation
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The agent-based BVM and CVM algorithms that we have presented in this section make
the relation between the models and individual opinion formation explicit. However, in prac-
tice, the corresponding Gillespie algorithms [69], based on the transition rate matrices given in
[53], produce numeric results for both models more efficiently and are mathematically equiva-
lent. We have, therefore, implemented our simulations with the Gillespie algorithms. The
source code is available from GitHub [70].
3 Consensus time in the BVM and CVM
The BVM has been studied by numerous authors during its 45-year history (for reviews, see
[12,14]), while the CVM is relatively new [53]. Here we review the main results concerning the
consensus time in complete graphs. Both the BVM and the CVM lead to a consensus within a
finite time, provided that the number of individuals N is finite (cf. [71] concerning the BVM
hypocrites
external
internal
t = 0.0
simulation 1
t = 1.0
t = 10.0
t = 100.0
simulation 2
Fig 2. Two illustrative simulations in a relatively small group (N = 16 individuals). Each panel shows the state of the group at a given time from t = 0.0 to
100.0. (We write time with a decimal point because it is a continuous variable in our model.) The update rates are c = 1,e = 1/4, and i = 1/16. In each snapshot,
the upper/lower nodes show the external/internal opinions (red or blue). In the external layer, the nodes are linked in a complete graph. We do not show the
links, only indicate full connectedness by a gray box. (The reflexive self-link is also included. Therefore, every individual is linked with N = 16 individuals
within the external layer.) The link between each individual’s external and internal opinion is represented by a vertical line. Arrows mark those individuals who
are hypocrites. The color of the arrow shows the external opinion. Initially, both groups contain 12 red and 4 blue opinions in the external layer. The difference
is in the occurrence of hypocrisy: in the left/right column, every individual is initially hypocritical/frank. By t = 100.0, one of the opinions has reached a
significant majority in each simulation (i.e., the group is close to a consensus).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.g002
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and [53] about the CVM). The only exception occurs when i = 0 in the CVM and both r and b
are present in the internal layer. In that special case, r and b persist for an infinitely long time.
In the BVM, the mean consensus time in the complete graph is [58]
TðBVMÞcons ðrRÞ ¼  
N
c
½rR lnrR þ ð1   rRÞlnð1   rRÞ�; ð1Þ
where N is the number of individuals, c is the copying rate, and ρR is the proportion of the red
opinion in the external (i.e., only) layer at time t = 0. Note that TðBVMÞcons is symmetric under the
exchange of the red and blue opinions because ρB = 1−ρR. For obtaining the mean consensus
time in the CVM, it is worth introducing a new variable,
m rR; rrð Þ ¼
irR þ err
eþ i
; ð2Þ
where ρR = ρRb+ρRr is the fraction of externally red individuals and ρr = ρBr+ρRr is the fraction
of internally red individuals (Table 1). We can interpret m as the overall “strength” of the red
opinion because it characterizes the actual weight of the red opinion in the group, as e and i
express the flow of information between the two layers. The expected value of m remains con-
stant throughout the process of consensus formation; that is, m(ρR,ρr) is a martingale [53]. As
a consequence, m(ρR,ρr) is equal to the probability that the consensus in a group with initial
conditions (ρR,ρr) is red. (We will show numerical evidence for this equality in Section 4.3.)
The mean consensus time TðCVMÞcons in the CVM can be directly obtained from that in the
BVM,
TðCVMÞcons ðmÞ ¼ tðc; e; iÞ � T
ðBVMÞ
cons ðmÞ; ð3Þ
where
tðc; e; iÞ ¼
ðcþ eþ iÞðeþ iÞ2
i½ðeþ iÞ2 þ ci�
: ð4Þ
On one hand, because τ(c,e,i)>1, the mean consensus time is always longer in the CVM
than in the BVM, given the same number of individuals N. Thus, the existence of hypocrisy in
a group increases the consensus time. On the other hand, the probability m of a red consensus
and the mean consensus time TðCVMÞcons are fully determined by c, e, i, n, ρR, and ρr (see Eqs 2–4),
and thus do not depend on the amount of hypocrites ρRb or ρBr. To resolve this paradox, it is
necessary to better understand the transient behavior of the CVM, particularly the role of hyp-
ocrites in the consensus-finding process. This observation motivated the present study.
4 Results
4.1 Consensus formation in the CVM
We study the changes in the state (ρRb,ρBr,ρRr) over time. Table 2 and Fig 3 present results
from simulations for four different initial conditions. All these simulations were performed
with the same parameters N = 400, c = 1, e = 1/4, and i = 1/16. We have also carried out simula-
tions for various other parameter combinations and report representative results in the S2
Appendix. In Table 2, we denote by F the fraction of simulations in which the consensus is
red. (In the table, we also list the equilibration time Tequal that we define and discuss in Section
4.2.) Table 2 underlines the excellent agreement between theoretical prediction and numeric
simulations. We also observe agreement for other parameters. We support this claim by show-
ing the results for another parameter combination in the S2 Appendix.
The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation
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We show in Fig 3A and 3B (and, for another parameter combination, in the S2 Appendix)
that the process of consensus formation in all realizations takes place in two stages. The first
stage is relatively short and is dominated by a directional change in the group’s composition:
the trajectories go toward an attractor, which is an arch-shaped curve (plotted as a black curve
in Fig 3). The S1 Appendix shows that the curve is given by
rRb ¼ rBr ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðeþ iÞ2 þ 4cðcþ eþ iÞrRr
q
  ðeþ iÞ
2c
  rRr: ð5Þ
The second stage of consensus formation is characterized by a random walk along this
curve. The deviations of the trajectories from the theoretical curve are caused by the finite size
of the simulated system (N = 400). The walk ends by reaching one of the two consensus states
(i.e., ρRb = ρBr = 0 and either ρRr = 0 or ρRr = 1). The direction of each step in the walk is ran-
domly selected. However, unlike in conventional unbiased random walks, the frequency of
steps is decreasing as the consensus is approached because most copying events are between
like-minded individuals. Moreover, near the consensus, there are only few hypocrites left so
that externalization and internalization are also unlikely to change the state.
It is interesting to observe the wide range of the walk in the second CVM stage. For exam-
ple, the trajectory indicated by purple diamonds in Fig 3C ends in a consensus in which the
blue opinion wins (i.e., ρRb = ρBr = ρRr = 0); nevertheless, the trajectory goes through some
points in which ρR>0.5, (i.e., the red opinion is temporarily the majority in the external layer).
The probability of a reversal from an external red majority ρR(t)>0.5 at time t to a blue consen-
sus is equal to 1−m[ρR(t),ρr(t)], where m is given by Eq 2. We note that this probability does
not depend on the system size because m is independent of N.
4.2 Equalization of the number of hypocrites
There are two kinds of hypocrites: Rb (i.e., externally red) and Br (externally blue). We denote
the difference in the abundances by D = ρRb−ρBr. In Fig 3A, we see that the abundances of the
two kinds of hypocrites tend toward equality in the first stage of consensus formation (i.e.,
D ! 0, where the overline denotes the mean, averaged over different simulations). A projec-
tion of the data onto the (ρRb,ρBr) plane (Fig 3B) shows this tendency even more clearly. The
black line (i.e., the projection of the attractor) is exactly on the diagonal.
Table 2. The four cases of CVM simulations that are displayed in Figs 3 and 4.
Symbol & Color ■ ▲ ◆ ▼
Initial value ρRb 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75
ρBr 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.00
ρRr 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00
F Observed 0.81±0.02 0.65±0.03 0.57±0.03 0.17±0.02
Predicted
(m, see Eq 2)
0.80 0.65 0.55 0.15
TðCVMÞcons Observed 2630±160 3270±160 3470±150 2090±140
Predicted (Eq 3) 2563.0 3316.2 3524.6 2165.1
Tequal Observed 3.23±0.05 3.23±0.11 3.14±0.23 3.15±0.07
Predicted (Eq 7) 3.2
The top row shows the symbols and colors used in the figures. The next three rows show the initial conditions. The remaining rows compare measurements from
simulations (N = 400, c = 1, e = 1/4, i = 1/16) with theoretical values. Each measurement is the sample mean of 1000 simulations. Uncertainties are given as 95%
confidence intervals. It is noteworthy that the time until consensus TðCVMÞcons is much longer than the equalization time Tequal. (See Section 4.2 for the definition of Tequal.)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.t002
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Fig 3. Changes in the composition of the group over time in four realizations of the CVM. Each point belongs to one “snapshot” between the initial state (large, filled
symbols) and the consensus (large, open symbols). The parameters for all simulations are N = 400, c = 1, e = 1/4, i = 1/16. We show only a single simulation for each
initial condition, but we note that repeated simulations from the same initial state can end in either of the absorbing states unless the initial state is already a consensus.
The time intervals between the plotted points change along the trajectories: during the transient, we plot every 100th time step until the 2000th time step. Afterwards we
plot only every 10000th time step because the spatial density of data points is higher along the attractor. (A) Abundances of the two kinds of hypocrites (ρRb and ρBr) and
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PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729 June 26, 2019 10 / 21
To examine this phenomenon in more detail, we plot the absolute value of DðtÞ from
t = 0.0 to 10.0 (Fig 4). The data points were obtained from 1000 independent repetitions. As
we derive in the S1 Appendix, we expect
DðtÞ ¼ D0 � exp½  ðeþ iÞt�: ð6Þ
(A rigorous proof is given in [53].) The straight lines in Fig 4 indicate the theoretical predic-
tions, which are an excellent fit to the numeric data.
In Fig 3, we illustrate that the equalization process is relatively fast compared to the subse-
quent random walk on the attractor. Let us define the equalization time Tequal as the time t sat-
isfying DðtÞ ¼ D0 � expð  1Þ,
Tequal ¼
1
eþ i
: ð7Þ
In the logarithmic plot of Fig 4, Tequal is proportional to the inverse of the slope. The plotted
examples and the last two rows of Table 2 confirm that Tequal is independent of the initial con-
ditions. Table 2 also shows that Tequal is much shorter than the mean consensus time TðCVMÞcons .
For the chosen rates (c = 1, e = 1/4, i = 1/16), TðCVMÞcons is longer than Tequal by around three orders
of magnitude. The precise ratio of TðCVMÞcons to Tequal depends on the initial conditions and the
parameters c, e, i and N. In particular, TðCVMÞcons increases linearly with N (see Eqs 1 and 3), but
Tequal is independent of N. So, even for only moderately large group sizes, the CVM spends
most of the time during consensus formation in the second, random walk stage. Simulations
with a different parameter combination (S2 Appendix) provide further evidence for the gener-
ality of this result.
The number of hypocrites is not the only observable that equalizes in the first stage. We
show in Fig 3C that the abundance of the red opinion becomes equal in the public (external)
and in the concealed (internal) layer (i.e., rR   rr ! 0). The time of equalization is exactly the
same as in the case of hypocrites above. The reason is that, because of ρRb = ρR−ρRr and ρBr =
ρr−ρRr, we obtain
D ¼ rRb   rBr ¼ rR   rr: ð8Þ
Consequently, Tequal applies as much to the equalization of the abundances between the
two layers as it applies to the equalization of hypocrite types.
It is important to note that the ratio of red to blue is the same in both layers during the sec-
ond stage, which is the predominantly longer stage during the process of consensus formation.
This observation suggests that estimating the abundance of an opinion in the public layer gives
a good prediction for the abundance in the concealed layer. (We consider the implications of
this result in Section 5.1.) The statement refers, of course, to the averages in the population.
The individuals who bear these opinions can be different at different times. Furthermore, Eq 6
neither predicts ρRb nor ρBr, only the mean difference D ¼ rRb   rBr . At some parameter com-
binations, we temporarily find a considerable amount of hypocrites before reaching a consen-
sus, while for other combinations most of the individuals are frank.
the proportion of frank red individuals (ρRr). These variables completely describe the state of the system. The theoretical attractor (Eq 5) is shown as a black curve. (B)
Equalization of the two kinds of hypocrites in the same realizations. In a consensus, there are no hypocrites (i.e., ρRb = ρBr = 0). Therefore, the open symbols at the
consensus overlap. The attractor appears as a straight line because it is a two-dimensional projection of the curve embedded in three dimensions. The line is exactly on
the diagonal. (C) Equalization of the abundance of the red opinion in the external (ρR = ρRb+ρRr) and internal layer (ρr = ρBr+ρRr). The attractor (black line) is exactly on
the diagonal.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.g003
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4.3 The (un)importance of hypocrisy
As we pointed out earlier, the opinion dynamics on a complete graph must end in either a red
or blue consensus (provided that the number of individuals N is finite). How do the initial con-
ditions and the rates c, e and i influence which opinion is going to win (i.e., becomes the con-
sensus opinion)?
Fig 5 shows theoretical predictions together with simulation results. We show in Fig 5A that
the frequency F of red winning is equal to the initial value of m, defined in Eq 2. Since the formula
for m does not contain c, the probability of winning does not depend on the communication at
the external layer, but only on the interaction between the external and internal layer (expressed
by e and i). Another noteworthy result is that the abundances of the hypocrites ρRb and ρBr do not
appear in Eq 2 either. They are implicitly present in the equation because ρR = ρRb+ρRr and ρr =
ρBr+ρRr. However, to predict the eventual winner, it is sufficient to know only two variables,
namely ρR and ρr. In fact, after the attractor (given by Eq 5; black curve in Fig 3) has been reached,
we do not even need to know ρr any longer. By that time, the abundances in both layers are, on
average, equal (see Fig 3C). So the probability of a red victory is directly given by the abundance
ρR of red in the external layer, which is easier to observe in real life than the internal abundance ρr.
Unlike F, the mean consensus time TðCVMÞcons does depend on c and N. This statement follows
from the combination of Eqs 1, 3 and 4,
TðCVMÞcons ¼  
Nðcþ eþ iÞðeþ iÞ2
ci½ðeþ iÞ2 þ ci�
m lnðmÞ þ ð1   mÞ lnð1   mÞ½ �: ð9Þ
We confirm this result with Fig 5B: data points for different N and c fall on different curves.
Still, neither ρRb nor ρBr appear explicitly in Eq 9. Consequently, m is all we need to know
about the initial condition in order to predict TðCVMÞcons . After we have reached the attractor, m is
initial state
0.01
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1.00
0.0 5.0 10.0
t
|D
|
        ρRb,   ρBr,   ρRr
0.00, 1.00, 0.00
0.25, 0.75, 0.00
0.50, 0.25, 0.25
0.75, 0.00, 0.00
Fig 4. Equalization of the two kinds of hypocrites over time. The parameter values are the same as in Fig 3. The initial
conditions are also the same for the corresponding shapes and colors. The vertical axis shows the absolute value of the mean
difference D ¼ rRb   rBr on a logarithmic scale. The mean was obtained from 1000 independent realizations. The error bars
are shown only where they are larger than the symbol sizes. The solid lines are theoretical predictions under the assumption
that D decays exponentially with rate e+i (Eq 6).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.g004
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equal to ρR so that we can, at that stage, make a prediction for the mean consensus time simply
by observing the abundance of the red opinion in the external layer.
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Fig 5. The consensus distribution and consensus time in the CVM. Numeric results confirm that these properties of
the CVM depend only on m (defined in Eq 2), the initial strength of the red opinion. (In the plot, we have deliberately
added jitter in the horizontal direction to make individual data points visible. Otherwise the overlap would obscure that
there are multiple points on top of each other.) Each symbol shows the mean of 1000 simulations. All simulations use e =
1/4 and i = 1/16. N, c, and the initial conditions vary. (N is symbolized by the size, c by the shape, and the initial
condition by the color; see legend.) (A) Proportion of simulations in which the red opinion wins (F) as a function of the
initial strength of red [m(t = 0)]. The diagonal line indicates F = m. The overlapping symbols exemplify that simulations
with different initial conditions produce the same F if the initial m is the same, despite different abundances of
hypocrites. (B) The mean consensus time TðCVMÞcons as a function of m. The gray curves are theoretical predictions from Eq
9, which is derived under the assumption that N is large [53]. The simulations confirm that Eq 9 is a good approximation
even for moderately large N. For different N and c, the values of TðCVMÞcons fall on different curves. However, for given N and
c, TðCVMÞcons depends only on m, but not on any further details of the initial conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729.g005
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5 Discussion
5.1 The symmetry of hypocrisy
We studied the role of hypocrisy in a relatively simple model, the CVM in a complete graph.
The CVM extends the original voter model (BVM) by incorporating an internal opinion that
can be different from the external one (i.e., hypocrisy can occur).
In the CVM, each individual is exposed to two kinds of tension during the process of opin-
ion formation,
a. tension caused by the disagreement with another individual and
b. cognitive dissonance [45] caused by a difference between the external and internal opinion
of the individual.
Adopting the external opinion of a disagreeing neighbor releases tension (a). Externaliza-
tion or internalization releases (b). In some cases, both types of tension can be simultaneously
annihilated. In other cases, the reduction of one type of tension can directly lead to new ten-
sion of another type.
We showed that the consensus process in the CVM consists of two stages,
1. approaching the attractor (given by Eq 5) from the initial state and
2. a random walk on the attractor.
A characteristic feature of the attractor is ρRb = ρBr. That is, the hypocrites of both types
(externally red and externally blue) are expected to be equally abundant, regardless of whether
R or B is in a majority. For realistic parameters, stage 1 is much shorter than stage 2 so that
ρRb�ρBr for almost the entire duration of opinion formation. In particular, in the CVM even a
great imbalance of opinions in the public layer (in our notation, a great difference between ρR
and ρB = 1−ρR) is accompanied by a balance of opinions among hypocrites (i.e., a small differ-
ence between ρRb and ρBr).
A second equality follows directly from the equalization of the hypocrites and Eq 8:
rR   rr ! 0. This means that the representation of the red opinion becomes the same in the
external and the internal layer. This result might have some noteworthy consequences for
opinion polls. Traditional survey methods sample the external layer only. In general, it is diffi-
cult to reach the internal layer (i.e., to get information about the concealed opinions) due to
privacy or sensitivity concerns. In many cases, however, it would be crucial to know opinions
hidden in the internal layer, especially when the action of the person is more strongly influ-
enced by the internal than the external opinion. Examples include decisions whether to buy or
consume a particular product or read an online source of information. Another example are
elections, where the internal opinion is expressed by an action (e.g., voting for a party) without
revealing the vote in public. Exit polls and surveys that mimic a secret ballot attempt to directly
measure the internal layer.
The main consequence of our results is that a poll that asks only about the external opinions
may still make a good estimate about the internal opinions as well, at least at the group level,
assuming that there is no external desirability bias that would differentiate between the public
expressions of the two opinions. Political polls are examples in which respondents can show a
“public” face so that the internal opinion of many participants may remain hidden. This is
even more likely in focus group studies or in a public discourse. If ρR = ρr holds, then this ten-
dency does not make the poll invalid: the result of the poll may in fact be fairly accurate in
spite of the occurrence of hypocritical answers. A remarkable result in the CVM is that neither
the majority nor the minority opinions are externally overrepresented because of hypocrisy. In
The impact of hypocrisy on opinion formation
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0218729 June 26, 2019 14 / 21
a neutral context without a media bias and an exogenous desirability bias, there is no expected
difference between bandwagon and underdog hypocrisy.
5.2 How to shorten or prolong the consensus time
A long consensus time may be disadvantageous, for example, when a coordinated action is
needed in a group. For instance, this is the case in jury decision making, which has been stud-
ied extensively [72–76]. Conversely, delaying a consensus may be desirable in those situations,
in which the diversity of opinions is valuable. We have pointed out in Section 4.2 that TðCVMÞcons
increases linearly with N so that one strategy to delay a consensus simply is to expand the
group size. The linear scaling of the consensus time with N, however, is not specific to the
CVM. We find the same scaling relation in the BVM too (see Eq 1). Besides changing the
group size, which properties of the concealed layer influence the consensus time?
We know from Eq 4 that the delay τ depends only on the copying rate c, the externalization
rate e, and the internalization rate i. If these rates are positive, we have τ>1 so that the CVM
needs more time to reach consensus than the BVM with the same value of c [53]. For example,
for the parameter combination used in Table 2 (c = 1, e = 1/4, i = 1/16), we obtain τ�12.8; that
is, the CVM needs on average around one order of magnitude longer to reach a consensus. We
are not aware of any empirical study that suggests specific values for e or i. To investigate the
effect of varying e and i, we carry out simulations in the S2 Appendix where we swap their
value compared to Table 2 (i.e., c = 1, e = 1/16, i = 1/4). In that case, the consensus time is
shorter, as predicted by Eq 3.
It is instructive to consider the limiting cases of the CVM if the rates e or i are extremely
fast or slow. On one hand, in the limit i!1 we would have simply retrieved the BVM. The
prediction of Eq 4 is, accordingly, τ!1 in this limit. On the other hand, increasing e and
decreasing i can enhance the consensus time to enormous values. Thus, to maintain a longer
coexistence of alternative opinions, one could aim to increase e, for example by encouraging
self-expression [77–79], whereas decreasing i is more difficult to accomplish in real life because
the institutions of socialization (school, work, the state, and the media) are well established. In
the limit i!0, TðCVMÞcons goes to infinity. The reason for this divergence is that, in this case, the
internal layer does not change at all so that any disagreement in the internal layer remains fro-
zen in time.
The zealot voter model, introduced by Mobilia et al. [57], applies the limit i!0 together
with e!1 for a certain fraction of the group. These “zealots” never change their internal opin-
ion and always express this opinion openly. Some other models in the literature can also be
“translated” into two-layer voter models with fixed internal states (i.e., i!0). For example,
there are models with “inflexible minorities” [80], “stubborn agents” [81], or “partisans”
[59,60], in which the individuals have a fixed and innate preference for one of the (external)
states. To the best of our knowledge, the CVM is the first model in which the internal layer can
change so that the interaction between the two layers is bidirectional.
The winning opinion is not necessarily a majority opinion; for instance, as Nemeth and
Wachtler [82] expressed, consistent minority views can affect other members of a jury whilst
reaching their verdict in fictional courts. Minority opinions can also have an impact on public
discourse in social questions such as feminism, the death penalty, or homosexuality [79,83,84].
The interplay between the layers slows down the CVM compared to the BVM, but, interest-
ingly, the number of hypocrites is not directly responsible for the deceleration. As we pointed
out above, the hypocrite abundances ρRb and ρBr do not appear explicitly in the formulas for m
and TðCVMÞcons (see Eqs 2 and 9). In other words, both m and T
ðCVMÞ
cons are determined by the mar-
ginal frequencies in Table 1 (i.e., ρR and ρr) alone, which do not uniquely determine the joint
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frequencies ρRr, ρBr, ρRb, and ρBb. For example, a group with ρR = 1/2 and ρr = 1/2 may consist
purely of hypocrites (ρRb = ρBr = 1/2, ρRr = ρBb = 0) or purely of frank individuals (ρRr = ρBb =
1/2, ρRb = ρBr = 0). The consensus time is the same in both cases.
In this sense, the CVM is slower than the BVM because of the mere existence of the con-
cealed layer and, thus, because of the opportunity for hypocrisy, but not because of the amount
of hypocrisy. The concealed layer serves as a pool of opinions. Hypocrisy necessarily emerges
in such a system as a path from one opinion to another, but the amount of hypocrisy does not
drive the consensus process.
6 Summary and outlook
This study presented and analyzed the Concealed Voter Model (CVM) as a relatively simple
model of opinion dynamics with the possibility of hypocrisy (i.e., internal and publicly
expressed individual opinions might differ). The study demonstrated that the process of con-
sensus formation in the model takes place in two stages. The first stage is relatively short and is
characterized by an equilibration in the number of hypocrites of both types (ρRb�ρBr) or,
equivalently, an equilibration in the opinions in both layers (ρR�ρr). The second stage is a ran-
dom walk along an attractor to which the opinion distributions quickly converge. We investi-
gated the time TðCVMÞcons needed to reach a consensus and compared T
ðCVMÞ
cons to the consensus time
TðBVMÞcons in the Basic Voter Model (BVM), in which hypocrisy is non-existent.
An important result is that hypocrisy always prolongs the mean time needed to reach una-
nimity of opinions. This result calls for policy measures that could eliminate or decrease the
second stage of the dynamics in jury and committee decision making where consensus and
fast decisions are highly desired, for instance by requiring a critical (high) threshold instead of
unanimity [72,73].
As a second important result, the study showed that the number of both kinds of hypocrites
equalize. This is good news for opinion pollsters who suffer from bias induced by hidden opin-
ions. The model demonstrates that, in a neutral scenario, the numbers of both kinds of hypo-
crites balance each other out–so any empirical observation of bias is due to external factors or
heterogeneous externalization and internalization rates that correlate with party preference.
As a third important result, the study demonstrated that in the CVM, just like in the BVM,
the consensus time increases linearly with population size. This result is in line with observa-
tions that coordination in a larger group is more difficult, but not disproportionately more dif-
ficult than in a smaller group [72,74].
The simple CVM can be extended in multiple directions. So far, we have assumed that the
links between individuals constitute a complete graph. It would be interesting to consider
whether permitting different graph structures would change the results qualitatively. Previous
work highlighted that the network structure is important for opinion dynamics in general
[85]. In the BVM, networks with broad degree distributions shorten the time till consensus
[58]. In a model similar to the BVM, Axelrod [86] has shown that minority opinions can sur-
vive and consensus may never be reached if network routes of influence are dissolved so that
opinions are cut out completely from interactions with opposing opinions. Minority opinions
are also likely to survive in models where network ties of influence are updated according to
opinion homophily so that there is a co-evolution of networks and opinions [87–90].
Another way to increase realism is to consider nonbinary opinions. The previous literature
has highlighted substantial differences between opinions measured on binary, continuous or
nominal scales [91]. From an empirical perspective, it would also be desirable to study non-
symmetric competition between the opinions. Asymmetry could be introduced, for instance,
by a “media” effect that causes bias in one direction (e.g., in social influence or externalization)
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[92–94] or by heterogeneous internalization rates that correlate with voter preferences. Beyond
a constant media bias in one direction, one could study exogenous stimuli that alter the direc-
tion of the bias. Such an extension could potentially explain the occurrence of cyclical patterns
that are not emergent from the current model, but are observable, for example, in fashion
trends and public sentiments [95,96].
Despite the limitations, we believe that studies that permit concealed opinions have a lot of
potential in understanding opinion dynamics because they incorporate an important feature
of real-life opinions: not everything is expressed openly.
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